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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we compare vulnerability management tools in 
two stages. In the first stage, we perform a global comparison 
involving thirty tools available in the market. A framework 
composed of several criteria based on scope and analysis is used 
for this comparison. From this global view of the tools, we 
detected that only three tools perform correlated analysis. 
Correlated analysis can be done in two ways: (i) correlation of 
scanning results with the output from other security devices such 
as firewall and intrusion detection systems, or (ii) correlation 
between vulnerabilities composing attack scenarios. Although 
both correlations add value to vulnerability management, the 
latter is especially important to unveil stepping stones which 
could be exploited by attackers. The comparison shows that two 
out of three tools perform correlation of the second type but 
scalability and the amount of manual input required  seems to be 
their biggest problems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A lot of organizations use Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
products nowadays. There are several reasons why COTS 
software is attractive. First, the time to market is much shorter 
for COTS software than for in-house developed projects. 
Second, the costs for in-house developed projects are usually 
much higher. Third, organizations not only depend on 
organization-specific information systems, but also on generic 
infrastructures. The software for these infrastructures is often 
provided by COTS vendors [7, 10], for example operating 
systems provide an infrastructure for an organization. Thus, 
often organizations depend on COTS software.  
Vulnerability management is becoming very important in 
organizations; the exploitation of vulnerabilities is costing 
organizations money every year. According to a report [44] by 
the CSI, compared to 2006, the average annual loss due to 
security problems has doubled in 2007. In 2007 alone, 6704 
vulnerabilities have been added to the NVD database. This is 
3% more than the total of 2006 [41]. Additionally there are other 
factors why organizations must perform vulnerability 
management: 
• Not even COTS vendors know how secure their 
products are [5]. 
• The consequences of vulnerabilities are left with 
product buyers because vulnerabilities are externalities 
[5]. 
This means that COTS products are likely to contain 
vulnerabilities and organizations (product buyers) are the ones 
who need to manage them. 
Although vulnerability management is necessary, it is not a 
straight forward task and requires balance. Security is always a 
trade-off between the costs of protection and the benefits from 
preventing successful exploitation of vulnerabilities by 
attackers. Thus, vulnerability management is not just a matter of 
applying patches straightaway, because they can introduce other 
vulnerabilities additionally the amount of patches is so huge that 
it is often too costly to apply all of them. As a consequence an 
organization needs to choose between fixes based on 
cost/benefit and need to prioritize the vulnerabilities they want 
to mitigate. 
Vulnerability management is not easy to do, because (i) there 
are so many vulnerabilities, (ii) low-risk vulnerabilities can be 
stepping-stones that lead to high-risk attack scenarios that can 
affect valuable assets [25, 62]. (iii) Vendors use vendor-specific 
nomenclature and scores for vulnerabilities, (iv) often 
companies have large infrastructures with a high amount of 
network devices all being subject to vulnerabilities, and (v) a 
single vulnerable point can compromise the security of the 
whole network. 
According to all the above arguments, it is very difficult for 
organizations to manage vulnerabilities by hand, so tools and 
standards are needed to help them. Furthermore, it is important 
that vulnerability management tools provide correlated 
information. This correlation can occur in the form of attack 
scenarios or in the form of checking information from different 
security devices, such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS’s) or 
firewalls. 
There are many standards rising in the COTS software 
vulnerability sector. It is now possible to look up the 
vulnerabilities of given COTS systems from comprehensive 
vulnerability libraries [29]. A standard for providing uniform 
names across vulnerability reporting sources is the Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [28, 34]. The Common 
Weakness Enumeration specification [35], currently maintained 
by the MITRE Organization, provides a common language of 
discourse for discussing, finding and dealing with causes of 
software security vulnerabilities as they are found in code, 
design, or system architecture. There are a lot more standards for 
vulnerability management, which are elaborated in more detail 
in subsection 2.1.3. 
Many tools have been developed for managing vulnerabilities 
within an organization, or on one single host. Some of these 
tools report in terms of standards. Since there are a lot of tools, it 
is not clear which of the tools use which standards and how do 
these tools manage vulnerabilities. A lot of questions arise here, 
e.g. do these tools manage vulnerabilities for an entire 
architecture consisting of multiple COTS software packages or 
just on a single host? There is no good overview of different 
vulnerability management tools. 
In this paper, we aim to compare vulnerability  management 
tools and our final objective is to understand how such tools 
address the challenge of correlation among information about 
vulnerabilities. This paper is structured as follows. First, in 
Section 2, a framework for the global comparison is described. 
Thirty tools are selected and the results are presented and 
discussed in Section 3. In Section 5 we select from the thirty 
tools, the ones which provide any sort of correlated analysis for 
a focused comparison (Section 6). Related work is reviewed in 
Section 7 and final conclusions are drawn in Section 8. 
2. FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL 
COMPARISON 
The criteria for the global comparison are divided into scope and 
analysis. 
2.1 Scope 
The scope of a tool is the range of a certain tool, and it is divided 
into multiple sub criteria elaborated in subsections 2.1.1 to 2.1.4. 
2.1.1 Software Platforms 
Vulnerabilities can and do reside in all platforms such as 
Windows, Unix, Linux, HP/UX, Solaris, and Mac OS. 
2.1.2 Magnitude 
The magnitude is the scale of the vulnerabilities managed by a 
tool. It can either be that a tool is only capable of identifying the 
vulnerabilities in a single host, or the tool is able to identify 
vulnerabilities in an entire architecture within an organization. 
2.1.3 Standards 
The following standards are the most common standards for 
vulnerability management and we will explain them below: 
• XCCDF 
The Extensible Configuration Checklist Description 
Format is a specification language for writing security 
checklists, benchmarks, and related kinds of 
documents [40]. 
• CVE 
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures is a 
standard for providing uniform names across 
vulnerability reporting sources [34]. E.g. CVE-2007-
3168 Summary: A certain ActiveX control in the 
EDraw Office Viewer Component 
(edrawofficeviewer.ocx) 4.0.5.20, and other versions 
before 5.0, allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary 
files via the DeleteLocalFile method. 
• CPE 
The Common Platform enumeration is a structured 
naming scheme for information technology systems, 
platforms, and packages, providing common names 
for all software systems. This makes it a lot easier to 
link the different vulnerabilities to systems, since 
everybody speaks about the same system when CPE is 
used. The CPE structure: cpe:/ {part} : {vendor} : 
{product} : {version} : {update} : {edition} : 
{language} [12]. An example of  a CPE: 
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows-nt:2000:sp4:pro 
• CCE 
The Common Configuration enumeration provides 
unique identifiers to system configuration issues in 
order to facilitate fast and accurate correlation of 
configuration data across multiple information sources 
and tools. A CCE list item containts: the CCE 
identifier number, a description, conceptual 
parameters, associated technical mechanisms and 
citations [33]. In Table 1 an example of a CCE is 
shown.: 
 Table 1 – CCE Example 
 
• CVSS 
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System provides 
a standardized rating for vulnerabilities present in the 
NIST (NVD) database. CVSS scores can range from 0 
(low severity) to 10 (high severity) [20]. For an 
example CVE-2007-3168 has a CVSS score of 7.8 
(High). 
  
Figure 1 – Portion of CWE Structure from NIST [39]. 
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2.1.4 Type of vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities can reside in three different areas: configuration, 
the source code and the environment (see  Figure 1) of software 
systems. 
• Configuration 
Vulnerabilities in the configuration are caused by 
configuration errors in the software which can be 
exploited by attackers, for example, for remote code 
execution on the attacked machine. 
• Source Code 
Vulnerabilities in the source code are caused by errors 
in the source code of software. These errors could, for 
example, make it possible to cause a buffer overflow 
error which can harm the attacked system. 
• Environment 
Environmental vulnerabilities are caused by direct or 
indirect modification of environment variables by 
attackers to exploit software. For example an attacker 
which changes an environment variable of the system 
in order to gain access to that system. The variable is 
changed by executing code on that software system. 
2.2 Analysis 
The criteria in this subsection elaborate the kind of analysis a 
tool provides for finding and assessing vulnerabilities in COTS 
Based Systems (CBSs). 
2.2.1 Kind of analysis 
We distinguish four types of analysis performed by vulnerability 
tools: compliance checking, patch management, vulnerability 
scanning and correlated analysis, as explained next. It is worthy 
to mention that when a tool performs one type of analysis, this 
does not mean that another kind of analysis is excluded. 
• Compliance checking 
Nowadays there are several security compliance 
frameworks and laws, such as HIPAA, SOX, 
ISO17799, GBLA, FDCC, FISMA, PCI. Tools can 
automate the process of checking compliance with 
these frameworks. 
• Patch Management 
Tools falling under this only give a list of e.g. patches 
installed, software that is installed, missing patches, 
etc. So only an inventory of a host is created, but no 
additional assessment is done with this information.  
• Vulnerability scanning 
Tools which comply to the vulnerability scanning 
category assess the vulnerabilities in a system or 
architecture and report vulnerabilities found. These 
vulnerabilities can be reported in terms of CVE’s or 
not. 
• Correlated analysis 
It is also possible that a tool correlates or aggregates 
vulnerabilities with other information (or 
vulnerabilities) in order to perform better vulnerability 
analysis. There are two types of vulnerability 
correlation currently discussed in the literature. First, 
correlation between different types of security devices 
like IDSs and firewalls. Second, correlation between 
several vulnerabilities which can be used as stepping- 
stones for an attack scenario. 
2.2.2 Types of results 
Many tools create an overview of the combined vulnerability 
score of a system in terms of how vulnerable a system or 
architecture is. This can be either done qualitatively, e.g. with a 
color ranging from green to red, or quantitatively with a number 
which can be vendor-specific and/or based on a CVSS score. 
2.2.3 Information available 
This criterion indicates whether enough information was 
available for conducting the comparison. 
3. GLOBAL COMPARISON 
The tools which are included in the comparison are listed in 
Table 2. The main selection criterion for the tools is whether 
they use some kind of standard and preferably CVE’s. The 
reason for this is the fact that the vendor-specific nomenclature 
is one of the reasons why vulnerability management is not easy 
to do. These standards allow sharing of vulnerability 
information among the community that needs to manage them. 
A cross in a box means that a tool qualifies to a certain criterion. 
An empty box represents a tool does not comply with a certain 
criterion. A question mark shows that not enough information 
was available to exclude or approve a certain criterion. Per 
criterion remarks on the comparison are given below. 
Almost all tools support multiple platforms. Apart from the 
standard platforms, often also HP/UX, Solaris and Mac OS are 
supported. This relates to the impact criterion, which shows that 
almost all tools support multiple systems and thus are capable to 
manage vulnerabilities in an entire architecture. Just three tools 
(Threatguard’s Secutor Prime Free [57], Belarc’s Advisor [8], 
and the CIS-CAT tool by CIS [14])  are only capable of 
scanning a single host. The other tools are capable of scanning 
multiple hosts. A remark here is that some of the tools do have 
scanners which can only scan a single host but the information is 
then collected by a central unit which analyses this information 
in an enterprise-wide manner to draw conclusions. 
The comparison gives some information about standards. A lot 
of the tools use or comply to some kind of standard, but the 
information regarding to what standards they comply to is often 
hard to find. 
Usually it is very clear which types of configuration and source 
code vulnerabilities the tools can uncover. However, it is 
difficult to find out whether the tools can detect environmental 
vulnerabilities. Only for the Security center by Nessus [54] it 
was clear that their tool is able to find environmental 
vulnerabilities. This is due to the fact that they also use 
information by Intrusion Detection Systems in order to create 
reports on vulnerabilities. 
For the analysis criteria there were also some remarks. First 
compliance to laws or quality frameworks is very important in 
business, there is much regulatory pressure; this is reflected by 
the number of tools which support compliance checking to the 
known compliance frameworks or information security laws, 
such as SOX, HIPAA, ISO 17799, and PCI. 
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Nessus [54] X X X  X X X X X X ? X X X  X X X 
Security Center 3 
[55] X X X  X X X   X X X X X X X X X X X 
GFI LANguard 
Vulnerability 
manager 8 [21] 
X X X  X  X    X X ? X X X   X X 
Secure 
elements 
C5 Platform [47] X X X  X X X X X X X X ? X X X  X X X 
Threatguard 
 
Secutor Prime Free 
[57] X   X  X X X X X X  ? X X X  X X  
Secutor prime 
Magnus [58] X    X X X X X X X  ? X X X  X X  
Vulnerability 
Management 
System [59] 
X X X  X X X X X X X X ? X X X  X ?  
Belarc Belarc NIST 
Advisor [8] X   X   X  X X X  ? X X   X   
IBM 
 
Internet Scanner 
[24] X X X  X  X    X X ?  X X   X  
Tivoli Security 
compliance manager 
[23]  
X X X  X ? ? ? ? ? X ? ? X X ? ?  X  
CA Vulnerability 
manager r8.3 [13] X X X  X ? ? ? ? ? X X ? X X X  ? ?  
Qualys QualysGuard 
Enterprise [42] X X X  X  X   X X X ? X X X  X X X 
Skybox Secure [52] X X X X X X X X ? X X X X X X 
Amenaza SecureITree [3] X X X X X X X 
Gideon 
Technologies 
SecureFusion Portal 
[22] X X X  X X X X X  X X ? X X X   X  
CIS CIS-CAT [14] X X X X X ? ? ? ? X ? ? X X ? ? ? ? 
Configuresof
t 
Enterprise 
Configuration 
Manager (ECM) 
[16] 
X X X  X ? ? ? ? ? X  ? X X   X   
Rapid7 NeXpose Unified 
vulnerability 
management (UVM) 
[43] 
X X X  X  X    X X ? X X X  X X X 
Core Security Core Impact 6.0 [17] ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
eEye Retina Network 
Security Scanner 
[18] 
X X X  X  X    X X ? X X X   X X 
McAfee 
 
Policy Auditor and 
Remediation 
Manager (PARM) 
[31] 
X X X  X  X  X  X  ? X X   ? ?  
Foundstone [30] X X X X ? ? ? ? ? X X ? X X X X 
NetIQ Risk and 
Compliance Center 
[38] 
X X X  X  X   X X X ? X X X  X X X 
nCircle Configuration 
Compliance 
Manager [37] 
X X X  X  X    X  ? X     X X 
Shavlik NetChk Compliance 
[49] ? ? ?  X ? ? ? ? ? X  ? X    ? ?  
ARM [48] X ? ? X ? ? ? ? ? X X ? X ? ? 
Microsoft Microsoft baseline 
security analyser 
[32] 
X    X      X  ?  X   X   
Cisco Cisco IntelliShield 
Alert manager [15] X    X  X   X X  ? X  X  X   
Lumension 
Security 
Patchlink Scan [26] X X X  X  X    X X ? X X X   X X 
BgFix Discovery 7 [9] X X X X ? ? ? ? ? X X ? X X ? ? 
nCircle’s Configuration Compliance Manager [37], NetIQ’s 
Risk and Compliance Center [38], and NetChk Compliance [49] 
by Shavlik even only support compliance checking. Second, 
almost all the tools provide patch management, mostly in 
combination with compliance checking. Third, vulnerability 
scanning is in all but one case combined with patch 
management. The only case in which it is not combined is in the 
Intellishield alert manager by Cisco [15]. And at last the 
correlation criterion is one to which only three of the thirty tools 
comply to. 
With respect to the reporting criterion, we found that although 
more tools report qualitatively, the difference is not 
significantly. Also some tools support both. The tools which do 
support quantitative reporting often fulfill this criterion by using 
the CVSS standard for scoring vulnerabilities. Only Amenaza’s 
SecurITree [2] and Rapid7’s NeXpose Unified vulnerability 
management (UVM) [43] have their own way of creating 
numerical scores for vulnerabilities. 
A few remarks on the global comparison must be made. First, 
there are three tools in the comparison which are freeware these 
are Tenable’s Nessus [54], Threatguard’s Secutor Prime free 
[57] and Belarc’s NIST Advisor [8]. Second, the amount of 
information was often limited so it was hard to find whether the 
tools did or did not comply with the comparison criteria. 
4. CRITERION FOR FOCUSED 
COMPARISON 
The comparison is structured as follows. First a description of 
the tools is given (section 5). Then a detailed description of the 
way the tools correlate vulnerabilities is given (sections 6.1 to 
6.3) and finally conclusions on the comparison are drawn 
(section 6.4). 
5. TOOLS FOR FOCUSED COMPARISON 
In this section we present the tools selected for the focused 
comparison. These tools are the only three tools in the global 
comparison (see Table 2) that support correlated analysis. 
5.1 Tenable Security Center 3.0 
The Tenable Security Center is a security suite which provides 
continuous, asset-based security and compliance monitoring. 
Tenable has two types of scanners, their active and passive 
scanner. The Nessus Vulnerability Scanner is an active scanner 
that provides a snapshot of network assets, their vulnerability 
exposure, their configuration, and if they contain sensitive data 
[55]. The Passive Vulnerability Scanner behaves like a security 
motion detector on the network. It maps new hosts and services 
as they appear on the network and monitors for vulnerabilities 
24/7. 
All the information gathered by the scanners can be used to 
create reports. There is a possibility to extensively drill down 
content making it possible for several audiences to get to the 
right information. 
5.2 Skybox Secure 
The secure suite by Skybox Security is based on the Skybox 
view platform. Skybox Secure automates and manages the risk 
lifecycle by identifying threat exposures, quantifying risk, and 
managing countermeasures. It collects and normalizes security 
information while producing key performance indicator and 
actionable intelligence. The Skybox secure package consists of 
three modules: Threat Alert Manager, Risk Exposure Analyzer, 
and Security Profile Advisor. 
The Threat Alert Manager normalizes and correlates threat and 
alert feeds, patch information, vulnerability data, and business 
information A ticketing system enables ticket creation and 
assignment that can be integrated with existing systems. Threat 
Alert Manager can also create and assign remediation tickets 
automatically to the appropriate personnel [51]. 
The Risk Exposure Analyzer continuously quantifies risk and 
prioritizes vulnerabilities by taking into account business logic, 
threats, security controls, and network policies. Security 
professionals can understand and analyze the business impact of 
threats, and simulate the most cost-effective remediation 
alternatives [51]. 
Finally, the Security Profile Advisor automates the collection of 
security and compliance data from multiple systems, calculates 
Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and presents security 
advisories through actionable dashboards and reports, by 
providing threat and remediation metrics [51]. 
5.3 Amenaza SecurITree 
The SecurITree application by Amenaza provides a tool to 
assess risks in an organization. It uses an attack-tree method for 
assessing how an asset in an organization can be attacked by an 
attacker, what harm he does with his attack, and what measures 
need to be taken to become immune to that attack [3]. The 
SecurITree application is not able to detect vulnerabilities itself, 
it is only able to correlate them based on the attack-tree which 
has to be created. 
6. FOCUSED COMPARISON 
In this section the comparison of the tools selected in the 
previous section (section 0) is conducted. The selected tools are 
compared in terms of the correlated analysis they provide one by 
one and put in separate sub sections. At last we provide a 
conclusion based on the comparison. 
6.1 Tenable Security Center 3 
The tenable security center uses a log correlation engine for the 
correlation of vulnerability information. This correlation engine 
correlates vulnerability information with Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) information. The tool is capable of using 
information from different kinds of IDSs, like the commercially 
available snort IDS .This correlation is done automatically. 
The real-time correlation is performed by the Security Center, 
which has knowledge of the state of each server’s vulnerabilities 
and automatically correlates known attacks against known 
vulnerabilities. This reduces the number of IDS alerts by 
exclusion of the false positive attacks [56]. 
The vulnerability information used by the Nessus Security 
Center is gathered from two sources, the active and passive 
vulnerability scanner. The advantage of the passive scanner is 
that it monitors the network 24-7, therefore data is always up-to-
date. This is crucial for the entire process. Assuming for 
example, that the vulnerability information is not up-to-date, an 
IDS alert could then be discarded as a false-alarm but, in fact, it 
was not. Such a situation must, at all times, be avoided.  
6.2 Skybox Secure 
Skybox Secure is based on attack graph analysis. It has a four 
step sequence for determining how vulnerable an organization’s 
network is to attacks. However, only the first two steps are 
related to correlation of vulnerabilities and will therefore be 
described here [50]. 
In the first step Skybox Secure creates an integrated security 
model in order to capture the business and IT environment 
context. The model consists of threats, network information, 
vulnerabilities data, and business assets. The threats need to be 
defined by the users and are, for example possible starting 
points, attacker skills, and likelihood of attack. There is however 
an initial set of threats defined after installation. Network 
information is automatically collected and consists of network 
topology, routers, firewalls, servers, and other hosts. For each 
gateway, namely routers and firewalls, routing information and 
access filtering rules are also collected. Business assets can be 
mapped in groups which can consist of a group of servers in 
several segments. And finally, the business impact rules need to 
be defined and linked to an asset in order to specify the potential 
damage to a certain asset. Different types of damage values can 
be modeled: confidentiality, integrity or availability, or 
regulatory compliance [50]. 
Figure 2 – Example of attack 
Figure 2
Scenario Skybox Secure [50] 
In the second step, attack 
scenarios are simulated in 
order to identify 
exposures. This is done 
by the Attack Simulation 
Engine developed by 
Skybox Security. The 
engine simulates all 
possible attack scenarios 
for all threats. An attack 
scenario represents a set 
of actions that can be 
performed by an attacker 
given the specific context 
of an organization’s 
network.  
represents an example of 
such an attack scenario. 
This scenario represents 
two web servers in the 
DMZ segment and one 
application server in the 
datacenter segment. 
Based on the attack scenario, vulnerabilities are classified in the 
following three categories: Directly exposed, indirectly exposed 
or mitigated. Directly exposed vulnerabilities pose an immediate 
risk to security and can be exploited directly by a threat. Indirect 
vulnerabilities, on the other hand, can only be exploited after a 
direct vulnerability has been exploited. Mitigated vulnerabilities 
cannot be exploited due to existing security measures [50]. 
Attack graphs are known to be badly scalable [25] since the 
amount of attack paths increases exponentially when the number 
of nodes in a network increases. According to Lippmann et al. 
[25], Skybox patent suggests that the complexity of their 
algorithm to find attack scenarios from a host representing the 
attacker to all other hosts, scales to N4 where N is the number of 
nodes in a network. This is significant for networks consisting of 
more than a few hundred nodes, and thus scalability for the 
solution provided by Skybox Security is not very high. A way to 
improve this would be to combine the nodes with the same 
configuration which reside in the same subnet and therefore 
share the same vulnerabilities [25]. This way the amount of 
nodes could be kept reasonably small, but it is not clear whether 
this is possible with the Skybox Secure tool. 
6.3 Amenaza SecurITree 
The tool by Amenaza is based on attack trees 
[45] which use a graphical, mathematical 
construction to model attacks. The model 
includes estimates of the resources needed to 
carry out specific attacks, the impact of those 
attacks on the victim and the benefits realized 
by the attacker [1]. The following 
information is required by the model before it 
can be analyzed: attacker behavior 
(scenarios), behavioral indicators, impact 
indicators, capabilities of attackers, 
propensity of attack [2]. 
An examle attack scenario (attack tree) is 
shown in Figure 3. At the top of this scenario 
the goal of the attacker is stated. An attack 
tree shows a logical breakdown of the various 
options available to an attacker. By 
performing the exploits associated with one 
or more leaf level events the attacker can achie
goal. The leaf with the round top (Garage Attack) represents an 
AND leaf. So both the garage must be entered and the house 
must be penetrated in order to successfully attack the garage. 
The OR nodes (e.g. Open passage) represent that only one of the 
exploits is necessary for reaching a higher level goal [1]. 
With this information in place
Figure 3 – Attack 
scenario example
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SecurITree 
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 the behavioral indicators are 
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ties. 
determined. These indicators show how likely certain leafs are 
to happen. This is done by selecting classes of resources, assets 
or traits  that are required to carry out the specific exploit. These 
values must be estimated by the analyst since they are often not 
at hand. It is necessary that all resource types and leafs have 
behavioral indicators [1]. 
Then impact indicators w
attack need to be defined. Damage from an exploit may be not 
too high but whenever another exploit happens the damage is 
accumulated towards the root node. These impact indicators can 
reflect loss of money, damage to reputation or even casualties. 
Finally the capabilities and the motivation of the attackers nee
to be modeled. The capabilities are for example the money or 
knowledge which an attacker has at his disposal. The motivation 
can be important for a more accurate estimation of the risk an 
organization is exposed to [1]. 
After the final model is completed the att
this is done automatically based on all the information which is 
put into the model. The outcome is the risk that a certain attack 
is carried out by an attacker. Adding up all the risks of the 
different scenarios gives the total risk figure for an organization 
[2]. 
6.4 Conclusion from focused comparison 
All the tools have a different way of correlating vulnerabili
Skybox’s Secure and Amenaza’s SecurITree both correlate 
vulnerabilities with each other by creating attack paths or 
scenarios as they call them. SecurITree’s scenarios are from the 
viewpoint of the attackers whereas the scenarios from Secure are 
from the organization’s viewpoint. The fact that SecurITree 
needs a lot of manual work and estimation to complete the 
model can make this tool error prone and time consuming. The 
total accuracy of this tool is purely based on the accuracy of the 
estimations. The problem with Skybox Secure and also with 
SecurITree is that scalability is quite low (few hundred nodes for 
Secure, Amenaza possibly even less because of the effort needed 
for development of an attack scenario) so it cannot be used in 
very large networks, which could benefit the most from such 
tools. The Tenable tool correlates vulnerabilities in a completely 
different way. It shows correlated vulnerabilities with IDS alerts 
in order to see which vulnerabilities an organization is exposed 
to and which are actually being exploited at a certain moment in 
time. 
All in all also low-risk vulnerabilities can be very important to 
work for this paper into two 
ys and comparisons of vulnerability 
h 
information to 
information. 
 we reviewed why vulnerability management is 
and argued why it is valuable when 
d 
 paper. 
d Attack 
, Amenaza Technologies Limited: 
mitigate, there seems to be a gap between what is needed by 
organizations to better manage vulnerabilities, i.e. a high level 
picture of attack scenarios generated automatically done in a 
scalable way, and what tools available in the market can deliver. 
However, further work to analyze even a more extensive set of 
tools is needed to confirm this claim. 
7. RELATED WORK 
We divided the relevant related 
parts, which we will discuss below. First, surveys and 
comparisons of tools. Second, correlation of vulnerabilities and 
correlation between vulnerability information and of output 
from several devices. 
There are some surve
management tools. However, they do not cover both aspects of 
correlation mentioned here, or are too superficial. An academic 
survey on buffer overflow written by Wilander and Kamkar [61] 
compares different tools for the prevention of dynamic buffer 
overflows. Another survey, written by Brackin [11], explained 
the steps of vulnerability management and discusses different 
tools for all the distinguished steps, however, the author looks at 
totally different criteria compared to this paper. Finally a book 
chapter [27] written by Manzuik et al. evaluate a selection of 
vulnerability management tools based on a framework they 
constructed, they do not take the correlation of vulnerabilities 
(attack scenarios) into account. A non-academic source of 
information is the SC magazine [46] which provides 
comparisons for commercial vulnerability management tools.  
Correlation of vulnerabilities is not new. The method whic
Skybox and Amenaza use is based on the methodology of attack 
trees and attack graphs. In 1991 Weiss published a paper [60] 
describing threat logic trees, this is the basis of the attack trees 
as we know them now. In 1994 Amoroso [4] detailed a 
modeling concept he called threat trees. More recently, Bruce 
Schneier [45] popularized the idea, and renamed it to attack 
trees. Other researchers have continued to develop the idea of 
tree based, threat analysis models [19, 36]. Lippmann and Ingols 
have summarized all work done on attack graphs until 2005 in a 
paper [25]. Another paper which gives a good overview of 
attack graphs and tools is written by Swiler [53]. 
Correlation of IDS alerts with other kinds of 
reduce the amount of false positives is often referred to, in the 
literature, as "log Correlation". A good overview can be found in 
the book Intrusion Detection by Bace [6]. Gula, the CTO of 
Tenable Network security has written a report on vulnerability 
correlation with IDS event, he discusses nine possible cases that 
can happen during correlation of IDS alerts with vulnerability 
8. CONCLUSION 
In this paper
important for organizations 
tools support correlated analysis. We performed a two-stage 
comparison for COTS based vulnerability management tools.  
First, thirty tools, both commercial and free-ware, were 
compared (Table 2). We found that standards are well supporte
and compliance seems to be a major selling point. However, 
only three tools supported correlated analysis. Second, the set of 
three tools which supported correlated analysis were the scope 
for a focused descriptive comparison. We found that one tool 
correlates the output of vulnerability scanning with the output 
from other security devices, and two tools correlate 
vulnerabilities. However, the comparison shows that scalability 
and the amount of manual input required are the biggest 
concerns at this moment for tools supporting correlated analysis. 
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